Beginning in the 1830s he became increasingly critical of what he calls Bentham’s “theory of human nature”. Fuchs, Alan, 2006, “Mill’s Theory of Morally Correct Action”, in: Lyons, David, 1978/1994, “Mill’s Theory of Justice, in: Miller, Dale E., 2011, “Mill, Rule Utilitarianism, and the Incoherence Objection”, in: Eggleston, Ben/Dale E. Miller/David Weinstein (eds. One plausible answer is that both dimensions must be regarded: the amount of happiness and the probability of its occurrence. In other places in the text we hear of the “promotion” or “multiplication” of happiness, and not of the “maximization”. Probably the first ones to raise this common objection were the British idealists F. H. Bradley (1876/1988) and T. H. Green (1883/2003). Mill subsumes this important and impressive kind of utility under the term security, “the most vital of all interests” (CW 10, 251). It then became one of the bridgeheads of a revisionist interpretation of Mill, which is associated with the work of David Lyons, John Skorupski and others. This hundredth of harm offsets the expected utility of this particular breach of rule (CW 10, 182). “I merely meant in this particular sentence to argue that since A’s happiness is a good, B’s a good, C’s a good, &c., the sum of all these goods must be a good.” (CW 16, 1414, Letter 1257). Virtuous actions are morally right, even if they are objectively wrong under particular circumstances. Modern readers are often confused by the way in which Mill uses the term ‘utilitarianism’. We have to differentiate between the following two statements: On the one hand, that actions occur necessarily; on the other hand, that they are predetermined and agents have no influence on them. But if it is possible to form someone’s character by means of education, then it is also possible to form one’s own character through self-education: “We are exactly as capable of making our own character, if we will, as others are of making it for us.”. In one of his most famous sentences, Mill affirms that it “is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (CW 10, 212). To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said (…). Mill answers the latter in the negative. An action can be wrong (bearing unhappiness), but its enactment would be no less morally right (Lyons 1978/1994, 70). His argument against intuitionistic approaches to moral philosophy has two parts. They protect an “extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility.” (CW 10, 250-251). This inductive conclusion serves as evidence for the claim that one’s own happiness is not only desired, but desirable, worthy of aspiration. Seen from the perspective of an all-knowing and impartial observer, it is – in regard to the given description – objectively right to perpetrate the homicide. The first points in an act utilitarian, the second in a rule utilitarian direction. For this reason, Mill sees no need to differentiate between the utilitarian and the hedonistic aspect of his moral theory. Often, though, we may be unsure what to say. He blocks this inference with the thesis that humans do not “naturally and originally” (CW 10, 235) desire other goods than happiness. But in contrast to immoral actions, inexpedient actions are not worthy of being sanctioned. His main point is that nobody’s life would be safe if people were allowed to kill others whom they believe to be a source of unhappiness (CW 10, 182). Mill is a determinist and assumes that human actions follow necessarilyfrom antecedent conditions and psychological laws. (CW 10, 235 and 8, 952). There are many persons to kill whom would be to remove men who are a cause of no good to any human being, of cruel physical and moral suffering to several, and whose whole influence tends to increase the mass of unhappiness and vice. The priority of the text was to popularize the fundamental thoughts of utilitarianism within influential circles. The utilitarian principle should only be applied when moral rules conflict:“We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to.” (CW 10, 226). He was taught Greek at age three and Latin at age eight. Mill’s answer is based on a thesis about how competent speakers use the phrase “morally right” or “morally wrong”. His own theory of morality, writes Mill in Utilitarianism, is grounded in a particular “theory of life…–namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends.” (CW 10, 210) Such a theory of life is commonly called hedonistic, and it seems appropriate to say that Mill conceives his own position as hedonistic, even if he does never use the word “hedonism” or its cognates. Roughly said, actions are right insofar as they facilitate happiness, and wrong insofar as they result in suffering. And this appears to be a rule-utilitarian conception. It comprises such things as protection from aggression or starvation, the possibility to shape one’s own life unmolested by others and enforcement of contracts. In contrast, the Second Formula tells us what our moral obligations are. John Stewart Mill was a philosopher, an economist, a senior official in the East India Company and a son of James Mill. Humans are guided by acquired dispositions. Thus, Mill’s considered position should be interpreted in the following way: First, the objective rightness of an act depends upon actual consequences; second, in order to know what we are morally obliged to do we have to draw on justified rules of the established moral code. Thus, a general rule that would allow to “remove men who are a cause of no good” would be worse than a general rule that does not allow such acts. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 2001, “Mill’s ‘Proof’ of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted Defense”, in: Urmson, James O., 1953, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill”, in. But the point here is not whether one’s inability is a source of depression or not. Mill was a controversial figure in 19th century Britain who advocated for the use of economic theory, philosophical thought and social awareness in political decision making. He is subsequently considered one of the most influential British thought leaders on political discourse, including epistemology, economics, ethics, metaphysics, social and political philosophy, and other concentrations. Society must make sure that the social-economic preconditions of a non-impoverished life prevail. But they do not exhaust the moral realm. For this reason, his position is often called “qualitative hedonism”. In his moral deliberation the agent can appeal to secondary principles, such as the prohibition of homicide, as an approximate solution for the estimated problem. But other parts are clearly unjustified. In the first step the actor should examine which of the rules (secondary principles) in the moral code of his or her society are pertinent in the given situation. This often occurs in non-systematic, prejudiced or distorted ways. Hedonism asserts that pleasure is the only intrinsic value. This does not exclude us from valuing actions, which are not in the moral realm, in regard to prudence.